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Abstract. In the process of formation and development of the institute of parliament, 
there is a need for timely improvement of the organisational and functional basis, consti-
tutional and other legislation, which contributes to the effective functioning of this institu-
tion. The existing legal non-regulation, both at the level of the Constitution and at the 
level of current legislation, do not allow the parliament to fully exercise its functions. 
According to many experts, bicameralism is a serious factor in reducing political tensions 
in the country, as there is usually less conflict between parties in a bicameral parliament, 
which leads to stabilisation of parliamentary activity based on a system of checks and 
balances. Taking into account the actualisation of the chosen topic of the article, its purpose 
is to comparatively study the experience of constitutional reforming of the countries in the 
field of bicameral parliament introduction, generalisation of positive practice and finding 
opportunities for its testing in Ukraine. The peculiarity of the article has been the combi-
nation of scientific-theoretical and empirical levels of studying the issues of constitutional-
legal fixing of the institute of parliament, its structure and activity, interaction with other 
branches of a single state power within the framework of the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers. The author, in view of the stated purpose, has solved the following 
issues: the multivariate scientific and practical approaches to the studied problems have 
been considered; a comparative legal analysis of the experience of forming chambers in 
the parliaments of the states has been conducted; conclusions and proposals on the pos-
sibility of establishing a bicameral parliament in Ukraine have been substantiated. An 
analysis of the role of parliaments has made it possible to come to a more thorough picture 
of the system of separation of powers in a particular country, about the existing restraints 
and counterbalances in order to further adapt the positive experience in the territory of 
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Introduction
One of the most pressing issues of 
constitutional reform is the change in the 
institutional structure of state power, in 
particular through the possibility of es-
tablishing a bicameral parliament [1]. 
According to many experts, bicameral-
ism is a serious factor in reducing po-
litical tensions in the country, as there is 
usually less conflict between parties in a 
bicameral parliament, which leads to sta-
bilisation of parliamentary activity based 
on a system of checks and balances. This 
is especially true for the current realities 
of Ukrainian politicum, when the con-
frontational style of behaviour of politi-
cal parties leads to the destabilisation of 
many state institutions, first of all, the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
Indeed, if to look at the constitution-
ally mandated powers of the upper cham-
bers of parliament and the practice of 
their activity in the countries of Europe 
and North America, it can be concluded 
that this chamber is intended to block the 
questionable enough in terms of the ben-
efits for the state and public development 
decisions of the lower chamber that is by 
its nature more prone to politicisation of 
approved decisions [2–4]. That is, the 
upper chamber is an institutional element 
that is able to subdue political passions 
and add stability to public policy pro-
cesses.
The introduction of a bicameral par-
liament in Ukraine would reduce the 
level of conflict in the mechanism of ex-
ercising state power, strengthen the rep-
resentative function of the parliament, 
increase the authority of local self-gov-
ernment, promote the better develop-
ment of regions, and ensure the stability 
of Ukraine’s political course. In general, 
bicameral parliaments provide a more 
sophisticated system of national repre-
sentation than unicameral parliaments. 
They are better at overcoming law-mak-
ing mistakes and making more balanced 
decisions.
In addition, the point of view is very 
spread that the upper chambers are car-
riers of a particular type of knowledge, 
depth of political thought and sound con-
servatism [5]. Thus, joining the upper 
chamber in Italy is associated with out-
standing services in the social, scientific 
or artistic fields. Thus, during the con-
struction of the building of the Brazilian 
Parliament, architect O. Niemeyer chose 
a quiet dome for the meeting room of the 
upper chamber, the Senate, while the 
dynamic “bowl” crowns the hall of the 
lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies 
[6].
In the context of public debate, it 
should be emphasised that a bicameral 
parliament is not a mandatory affiliation 
of a federal state. Given the number of 
our country and justify the relevant reforms. In addition, the analysis made it possible to 
state that such a reform is urgent and necessary, but it must be carried out, provided that 
the proposed copyright concepts are fully correlated with the vector of European integra-
tion chosen by our country.
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unitary countries with bicameralism on 
the European continent, a bicameral par-
liament can function harmoniously in 
states with a simple administrative and 
territorial structure. Thus, at least 10 
such countries can be found on the map 
of Europe, namely: Belarus, Ireland, 
Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Roma-
nia, France, Croatia and the Czech Re-
public (although in some cases the am-
biguity of the “simplicity” of the territo-
rial structure of these countries should 
be taken into account, such as Italy and 
its autonomous regions).
At the same time, it should be noted 
that not all representatives of science, 
practice and experts support the idea of 
establishing a bicameral parliament in 
the territory of our country. In particular, 
constitutional law expert B. Bondarenko 
argues that the implementation of the 
bicameral parliament concept can take 
ten years, and such a reform will not lead 
to a projected positive impact on the ef-
fectiveness of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine. In addition, the presence of 
paramilitary conflict and partial occupa-
tion on the territory of Ukraine will fa-
cilitate, in the context of delineated re-
form, the creation of regional parties that 
will produce a negative impact on the 
constitutional reform of the state as a 
whole [7].
The alternative outlined approaches 
substantiate the chosen purpose of the 
article, which consists in a comparative 
study of the experience of constitutional 
reform of countries in the field of bicam-
eral parliament introduction, generalisa-
tion of positive practice and finding op-
portunities for its testing in Ukraine. 
With this purpose in mind, the following 
tasks were set: 1) to consider the multi-
variate scientific and practical approach-
es to the studied issues and to substanti-
ate the feasibility of establishing a bi-
cameral parliament in Ukraine; 2) to 
conduct a comparative legal analysis of 
the experience of forming chambers in 
the parliaments of the states; 3) to sum-
marise the positive foreign experience of 
the existence of a bicameral parliament, 
to formulate sound conclusions and pro-
posals regarding the possibility of estab-
lishing a bicameral parliament in 
Ukraine.
1. Materials and methods
The article uses general scientific and 
special scientific methods of research, in 
particular. General methods that define 
philosophical and worldview approach-
es that express the most universal prin-
ciples of thinking. Among them are dia-
lectical and phenomenological methods 
that have made it possible to analyse the 
nature, concepts and meanings of con-
stitutional reform and the introduction of 
a bicameral parliament.
General scientific methods have also 
come in handy, where empirical research 
has played an important role: observa-
tion, comparison, description. Widely 
used theoretical and logical methods: 
deduction, induction, systematic ap-
proach, methods of analysis, synthesis, 
statistical method, the use of which al-
lowed to obtain reliable knowledge about 
the processes and features of the forma-
tion of the parliamentary institution in 
Ukraine and its reforming.
Special scientific methods have been 
used in the study of the evolution of the 
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Institute of Parliament in Ukraine and in 
other countries of the world. Chrono-
logical and comparative methods were 
also used. The latter, divided into syn-
chronous and diachronic methods, con-
tributed to the development of a number 
of proposals based on foreign experience 
in optimising the functioning of the Par-
liament of Ukraine and the introduction 
of the bicameral Parliament. The article 
also used the historical method of en-
quiry, which allowed analysing the insti-
tute of parliament from the position of 
the past, present and future.
The peculiarity of the article was the 
combination of scientific-theoretical and 
empirical levels of studying the prob-
lems of constitutional legal fixing of the 
institute of parliament, its structure and 
activity, interaction with other branches 
of a single state power within the frame-
work of the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.
The method of analysis allowed us 
to determine that the fatal event in the 
development and formation of the idea 
of bicameralism was the holding of an 
all-Ukrainian referendum on April 16, 
2000, in which 26 million citizens of 
Ukraine (or 89.91%) who voted in fa-
vour of forming a bicameral parliament 
in Ukraine. At the same time, it is worth 
paying attention to the direct formulation 
of the question that was put to the refer-
endum, “Do you support the necessity of 
forming a bicameral parliament in 
Ukraine, one of the chambers of which 
would represent the interests of the re-
gions of Ukraine and promote their im-
plementation, and make appropriate 
amendments to the Constitution of 
Ukraine and electoral law?” Thus, the 
people of Ukraine unanimously sup-
ported the establishment of a top-level 
regional representation body. The rea-
soning behind the stated people’s deci-
sion as the basis for reforming the system 
of representative institutions during the 
further implementation of the planned 
vectors of transformation of the national 
parliament, while simultaneously amend-
ing the Constitution of Ukraine, is con-
sidered to be sufficiently substantiated. 
At the same time, it should be empha-
sised that the attempts to implement the 
results of the all-Ukrainian referendum 
have not been implemented. The most 
significant reason for this phenomenon 
was the presence of a multivariate view-
point on the feasibility of such a reform. 
Unfortunately, these positions are still 
preserved. The Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine in the case of amending the 
Constitution of Ukraine on the initiative 
of the People’s Deputies of Ukraine 
No. 2-in / 2000 of July 11, 2000, ex-
pressed quite negatively about this. In 
particular, the court found in its opinion 
that the draft proposal was not compliant 
with the requirements of Articles 157 and 
158 of the Constitution of Ukraine re-
garding the establishment of a bicam-
eral parliament. The following argument 
was put forward in the argumentation of 
the mentioned position, “An analysis of 
the current constitutional practice of for-
eign states shows that the creation of a 
bicameral parliament in a unitary state 
is a matter of expediency. The content 
and scope of the rights and freedoms of 
a person and a citizen by itself is not 
directly influenced by the structure of 
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parliament (single or double chamber). 
However, they may be influenced by the 
procedure for the formation of chambers 
and the distribution of powers between 
them” (paragraph 3.1 of the reasoning 
part of the Opinion). As a consequence, 
given the fragmentation and inconsis-
tency of changes in the field of imple-
mentation of the bicameral parliament in 
Ukraine, the Constitutional Court found 
it impossible to pursue constitutional 
reform in this part. At the same time, the 
contents of the institution of the upper 
chamber, which was proposed in the 
draft, did not raise any objections and 
objections from the body of constitu-
tional jurisdiction.
The theoretical basis of the study is 
the work of foreign and domestic authors 
on issues of statehood, institutions of 
state power, constitutional reform, in-
cluding parliament.
2. Results and discussion
2.1 Features of creation of a bicam-
eral parliament in Ukraine
In the modern period of development 
of national statehood, a bicameral parlia-
ment building system is observed by 
many countries with a prosperous econ-
omy, a stable political system and high 
standards of civil and social rights. More 
than 70 states have opted for bicameral-
ism [8]. It seems quite reasonable that 
the parliamentary structure of any coun-
try is distinctive and unique, but most of 
the other chambers of the parliaments of 
the world have one thing in common – 
they are the specialised representations 
of the regions (entities) that make up the 
territorial units of the country (state). 
This is typical not only for all federal 
states, but also for many unitary states 
(France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, 
Japan, etc.).
Turning to the practice of introducing 
bicameralism on the territory of our 
country, it should be noted that after in-
dependence, Ukraine faced the problem 
of defining the path of its further state 
development and the creation of new 
institutions of government, including the 
parliament. Even in the process of draft-
ing the current Constitution of Ukraine, 
the creation of a bicameral parliament 
was repeatedly considered as a way of 
arranging a higher representative institu-
tion.
In particular, the draft Basic Law 
submitted for national discussion in 1992 
envisaged the creation of a bicameral 
parliament (the National Assembly) in 
Ukraine, which was to consist of a Coun-
cil of Deputies (lower chamber) and a 
Council of ambassadors (upper cham-
ber). The developers of this project 
sought to bring to life the idea of a 
“strong” upper chamber, “The Council 
of Deputies and the Council of Ambas-
sadors exercise the powers of the Na-
tional Assembly on the basis of equality 
and division of functions” (Article 139 
of the project). In view of the proposed 
principle of equality of chambers, it was 
assumed that they would be endowed 
with identical powers in the legislative 
process, in particular, that both chambers 
would have to approve it for the adoption 
of the law. In order to remedy the differ-
ences, it was proposed that a conciliation 
committee of chambers be set up, which 
was responsible for developing a univer-
sal bill capable of meeting the require-
17
 
Two-chamber parliament: comparative analysis 
and experience of constitutional...
№ 12/2020
Tatsii V., petryshyn О.
ments and observations of both cham-
bers. The procedure for further “newly 
developed” draft law was also regulated 
in detail (Part 4 of Article 161 of the 
draft).
The idea of a bicameral parliament 
also found its place in the draft Constitu-
tion of Ukraine, developed by the Con-
stitutional Commission and submitted to 
the Verkhovna Rada on March 11, 1996. 
In particular, it was anticipated that the 
upper chamber, the Senate, would con-
sist of 80 members representing regions 
in following proportion – 3 each from 
the oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea and the city of Kyiv, and 2 rep-
resentatives from the city of Sevastopol. 
The Senate’s competence in the draft was 
to include the appointment on the sub-
mission of the President of the Supreme 
Court, the members of the Central Elec-
tion Commission, the Prosecutor Gen-
eral, as well as the issue of administrative 
and territorial organisation.
It is worth pointing out that the idea 
of bicameralism has also been supported 
by certain political forces that have pro-
mulgated their own constitutional proj-
ects. Thus, in particular, the draft of the 
Ukrainian Republican Party proposed 
the creation of a bicameral parliament, 
whose term of office would be 6 years. 
Nominal (personnel) powers were as-
signed to the upper chamber, including 
the appointment of diplomatic represen-
tatives and judges of the Constitutional 
Court. In the draft of the Christian Dem-
ocratic Party of Ukraine, the Senate con-
sisted of 150 members who were to be 
elected for 6 years in single-member 
constituencies, 3 from regions (including 
the capital) and 3 from the Crimean Tatar 
people.
Another significant event on the way 
to the endorsement of bicameralism in 
our country was the submission by the 
Head of State to the Parliament on March 
31, 2009 of the draft Law of Ukraine “On 
Amendments to the Constitution of 
Ukraine”, which provided for the cre-
ation of an upper chamber – the Senate 
in the structure of Parliament. The draft 
of this regulatory act regulated in detail 
the composition and powers of the new-
ly created Senate, the election procedure 
and the mechanism for exercising the 
assigned competence. However, this bill 
has not been implemented and has been 
criticised by various representatives of 
theory, practice and law-making [9].
Subsequently, the idea of introducing 
a bicameral parliament has repeatedly 
emerged in the drafting activity. Thus, a 
particular issue was highlighted at the 
beginning of the Constitutional Assem-
bly, approved by the Decree of the Pres-
ident of Ukraine of May 17, 2012 [10]. 
In its turn, the introduction of the bicam-
eral parliament was not a priority for 
reform and had a rather substantial tem-
poral framework, but was not finally re-
jected.
Today, after a long process of ratifi-
cation of the Association Agreement be-
tween Ukraine, on the one hand, and the 
European Union, the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member 
States, on the other hand (dated March 
21, 2014 and June 27, 2014)1, our state 
1   A plea for an association between Ukraine, 
from one side, that of the European Union, the 
European Union from the atomic energy and 
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is at the stage of intensification of refor-
mation and transformation processes. In 
addition, the election of the new Presi-
dent of Ukraine has led to a special ac-
tualisation of the introduction of a bi-
cameral parliament in Ukraine. At pres-
ent, it is possible to speak about the ac-
tive preparation of the relevant bill and 
lively public discussion.
Thus, it can be stated that bicameral-
ism remains a subject of close attention 
and a subject of debate in the theory and 
practice of national state formation. At 
the same time, the process of implemen-
tation of the proposed idea in the practi-
cal plane requires a comprehensive 
analysis of foreign experience, its unifi-
cation and finding of good practice in 
order to further test it in Ukraine.
2.2. Analysis of foreign practice in 
the sphere of formation of parliament 
chambers
In the context of debating the issue 
of complication of the structure of the 
Ukrainian Parliament, it is quite reason-
able to carry out a comparative analysis 
of foreign experience in the field of 
similar constitutional and legal reforms. 
Thus, L. T. Kryvenko stresses that the 
bicameral parliament is a fairly wide-
spread structure of the highest legisla-
tive body of the state. Moreover, for a 
long time, most parliaments of the 
countries of the world had a bicameral 
(two-chamber) structure [11]. In par-
ticular, the basis for comparison is the 
formation of the upper chamber and its 
competence.
member states, from the other side: the Law of 
Ukraine. (2014, September). Retrieved from 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1678–18
Let us first turn to the formation or-
der, which envisages two main ways – 
direct election of senators and the forma-
tion of the upper chamber by regional 
(regional) structures. According to ex-
perts, direct election of members of the 
upper chambers is used in 27 out of 66 
cases, in 21 cases the chambers are 
formed with the help of regional and mu-
nicipal representative bodies, and in 16 
countries other ways of appointing mem-
bers of such chambers are used. An ex-
ample of the latter is the order of forma-
tion of the upper chamber of the Na-
tional Parliament of Ireland, the Senate. 
It is made up of 60 members, 11 of whom 
are appointed Prime Ministers, and 49 
are elected (43 by professional groups, 
6 by universities) through a proportional 
representation system and secret ballot 
by mail. In turn, the lower chamber is 
also elected on a proportional basis. The 
cadence of both wards is 5 years [12].
Among the forms of direct elections, 
it is advisable to note the use of a mixed 
system of elections to both chambers of 
parliament. Thus, after the constitution-
al reform of 1993 in Italy, instead of a 
purely proportional one, a mixed elec-
toral system was launched: from then, 
75% of deputies are elected by majority, 
25% by proportional system. At the same 
time, the outlined approach is identical 
for both the lower chamber and the upper 
chamber of parliament.
Another approach to direct elections 
is demonstrated by Czech and Polish par-
liamentarians. For example, the Chamber 
of Deputies of the Czech Parliament is 
elected on the principle of proportional 
representation, whereas the upper cham-
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ber, the Senate, on a majority basis, is 
updated with a third of the composition 
every two years. The Polish Parliament 
has a more “regional” colour. Of the 460 
members of the lower chamber, the Sejm, 
391 are elected by district lists of candi-
dates in multi-member constituencies 
using preferences, and 60 deputies by the 
All-Polish list of candidates. As for the 
upper chamber, the Senate, the elections 
to it are held on a majority basis. At the 
same time, the majority district coincides 
with the territory of the voivodship, the 
largest territorial unit of the state. Thus, 
100 senators are elected to the Senate by 
two from 47 voivodships and by three 
from the two largest voivodships – War-
saw and Katowice [13]. It is advisable to 
emphasise that at the level of the Polish 
Constitution, the term “parliament” is not 
used in the sense of a single legislative 
body. Instead, under Article 95 (1) of the 
Basic Law, it is stipulated that the legis-
lature is exercised simultaneously by two 
institutions, the Sejm and the Senate 
[14–16].
Turning to the side forms of forma-
tion of the upper chamber, it is worth 
noting the procedure of formation of the 
upper chamber of the German Parlia-
ment – the Bundesrat, which consists of 
representatives of the governments of the 
lands that appoint and withdraw them. 
The number of members of the Bundes-
rat that may be delegated by a particular 
country depends on the population of the 
land: each land has the right to delegate 
three representatives; land with a popula-
tion of more than 2 million has four 
votes, land with a population of more 
than 6 million – five votes, land with a 
population of more than 7 million – six 
votes. It should be emphasised that the 
position of the land must be fully agreed 
on a particular issue. More complex, but 
more effective in terms of regional rep-
resentation, the method of forming the 
upper chamber (Senate) was introduced 
in France. For example, the Senate is 
elected by departments (regions) of col-
leges consisting of elected in the depart-
ment of lower chamber deputies, region-
al advisers, general advisers of this de-
partment, delegates of municipal coun-
cils and their deputies. The number of 
delegates from municipalities depends 
on the size of the population.
Also, the study should take into ac-
count the classification of bicameral par-
liaments developed by the science of 
constitutional law. In particular, there are 
parliaments with a weak upper chamber 
and parliaments with a strong upper 
chamber [17–19]. It is advisable to ex-
pose their differences and problem spec-
ulations. The tendency for the upper 
chamber to be strong is quite widespread; 
the competence of both chambers is 
completely or overwhelmingly equal, 
and under such conditions the special 
powers of the upper chamber are gener-
ally less significant than those of the 
lower chamber; vice versa. Otherwise, 
in the presence of a weak upper chamber, 
the powers are divorced and subject to 
jurisdiction, moreover, the lower cham-
ber usually has advantages [3]. In most 
cases, chambers have the same rights to 
review and adopt laws. Perhaps that is 
why in the US the bill is allowed to enter 
any of the chambers of congress. The 
lower chambers, as a rule, have special 
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powers in the field of finance (budget 
adoption), while the upper chambers are 
more likely to ratify international trea-
ties. In the US and Ecuador, the upper 
chamber is vested with the power to ap-
prove government members and other 
officials appointed by the president [20].
Here are some examples. Thus, a 
strong upper chamber in a unitary coun-
try is the upper chamber of the Italian 
parliament – the Senate of the Republic. 
The “power” of the Senate lies, first of 
all, in the fact that at the level of the Con-
stitution it is recognised as equivalent to 
the lower chamber by the legislature: 
Article 70 of the Italian Constitution pro-
vides that “the legislative function is 
exercised jointly by both chambers”. 
This, in turn, means that the bill can be 
submitted to any of the chambers and is 
considered approved when deputies of 
both chambers vote for its adoption. It is 
also significant that the budget must also 
be approved by both chambers of the 
Italian Parliament (Article 81 of the Con-
stitution) [21]. An example of a weak 
upper chamber is the Polish Senate. At 
the level of the Constitution of Poland 
(Part 1 of Article 95), it is stipulated that 
the Sejm and the Senate shall exercise 
legislative power. In view of the above, 
it is advisable to express doubts about 
the possibility of 100% characterisation 
of the two designated institutions as 
chambers of parliament. In particular, the 
content of Article 95 and other norms of 
the Polish Constitution shows that both 
the Sejm and the Senate act as separate 
bodies of the legislature. Moreover, as a 
single body called the National Assem-
bly, the Sejm and the Senate act only in 
cases clearly defined by the Constitution 
(Part 114, Article 114 of the Constitution 
of Poland). It should be noted that the 
powers of the Senate are not equivalent 
to the powers of the Sejm, especially as 
regards the adoption of laws.
In some cases, there are situations 
where it is not possible to clearly attri-
bute Parliament to a particular group. 
The “mixed” nature of the competence 
of the upper chamber of parliament is 
manifested in the fact that the law can be 
adopted only after approval by both 
chambers. In this, unlike the procedure 
of passing a bill in parliaments with a 
strong upper chamber, in the event of a 
dispute between the fees on the bill, the 
Government is allowed to interfere with 
the law-making process by requesting 
the final approval of the bill by one of 
the chambers, as a rule, by the lower 
chamber. A striking example of such an 
intervention is France. Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 45 of the French Constitution, any 
draft law or legislative initiative is being 
progressively considered in both Cham-
bers of Parliament for the adoption of an 
identical text. If, as a result of disagree-
ments between the two chambers, a bill 
or legislative proposal has not been ad-
opted after two readings by each cham-
ber, or if, after one reading in each of 
them, the Government declares the need 
for urgent consideration, the Prime Min-
ister has the right to convene a meeting 
of the mixed commission that is obliged 
to propose new text on controversial is-
sues. The text prepared by such a com-
mittee may be submitted by the Govern-
ment for approval to both Chambers. 
Moreover, none of the amendments can 
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be adopted without the consent of the 
Government. If the mixed commission 
fails to adopt the agreed text or if the text 
is not adopted on the terms provided ear-
lier, the Government may, after a new 
reading in the National Assembly (lower 
chamber) and the Senate (upper cham-
ber), require the National Assembly to 
take a final decision.
The outlined procedure in science is 
called the “legislative shuttle”, which 
means the transfer of a bill from one 
chamber to another in a bicameral parlia-
ment to overcome differences between 
them before adopting a mutually agreed 
legislative text [22]. In some cases, a 
very detailed “legislative shuttle” proce-
dure is envisaged at the Constitution 
level. In this regard, we will note the 
constitutional regulation of this issue in 
the Basic Law of Belgium (which in 
many respects is similar to French rules). 
First of all, it should be noted that the 
Belgian Constitution sets out the spe-
cific joint legislative competence of the 
lower chamber of Parliament and the 
King, as well as the joint legislative com-
petence of both chambers. As a general 
rule, a bill passed by the lower chamber 
of parliament is referred to the Senate, 
which may consider it if at least 15 of its 
members so request. Over the next 60 
days, the upper chamber may either de-
cide that the bill does not need to be 
amended or adopt the bill after it has 
been amended. In the first case (as well 
as in a situation where the Senate did not 
consider the bill within the specified pe-
riod), the passed bill is passed to the 
lower chamber of the King for signature. 
The Constitution also provides for the 
possibility of creating a mechanism for 
overcoming conflicts between the cham-
bers. This is a typical institution such as 
the parliamentary conciliation commit-
tee, which is composed on a parity basis 
of members of the Chamber of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, which is em-
powered by its decisions to resolve con-
flicts between the chambers in the sphere 
of their legislative competence, includ-
ing to extend the terms of consideration 
of the bills. In this context, the approach 
of the Romanian legislators to resolving 
conflicts arising when the conciliation 
commission mentioned by us does not 
unanimously in its decision is quite in-
teresting. In such a case, the variant texts 
are presented for discussion by the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate at 
a joint sitting, which will adopt the final 
text by a majority vote (Part 2 of Article 
76 of the Romanian Constitution).
On the whole, it can be concluded 
that in the vast majority of cases at the 
present stage of state-building, the 
Chambers of Parliaments are endowed 
with almost equal powers in the field of 
law-making. Only in some cases it is 
possible to find that there is a certain 
advantage of the lower chamber, espe-
cially in the fiscal area. For example, the 
Senate of the Irish Parliament has no 
right to change the financial laws passed 
by the lower chamber. The exclusive 
competence of the lower chamber of the 
Austrian Parliament is the adoption of 
budgetary and financial laws.
The powers of the chambers in other 
spheres show some unevenness. For ex-
ample, in the area of scrutiny, when con-
sidering parliaments with a strong upper 
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chamber – the Government is account-
able and controlled by two chambers at 
once. In Romania, the Chamber of Dep-
uties and the Senate may withdraw the 
confidence of the Government expressed 
in a joint meeting by passing a resolution 
of no confidence by a majority of the 
votes of the deputies and senators. A 
similar norm is enshrined in the Italian 
Constitution (Article 94). An example of 
the variability of the competences of the 
chambers is the provision of Article 30 
(1) of the Czech Constitution, according 
to which only the lower chamber of par-
liament is empowered to set up commis-
sions of enquiry to investigate matters of 
public interest.
The presented and analysed variation 
approaches of different countries to the 
formation of the parliament and its com-
petence show that the adaptation of the 
tried and tested foreign models should 
be carried out with due consideration of 
the realities of a particular state, its ter-
ritorial structure, and the peculiarities of 
the legal system. In addition, the experi-
ence of countries with “strong” and 
“weak” chambers of parliament must be 
taken into account and agreed. At the 
same time, the readiness of the state for 
such reforms should be a special factor 
on the way to introducing a bicameral 
parliament.
Conclusions
An analysis of the role of parlia-
ments, including the upper and lower 
chambers, gives a more thorough picture 
of the system of separation of powers in 
a particular country, of the existing con-
straints and counterbalances in it, in or-
der to further adapt the positive experi-
ence in our country and substantiate the 
relevant reforms. The very task of pre-
venting the usurpation of power by a 
majority that ignores the interests of the 
minority, and of ensuring the stability of 
the government, was put before politi-
cians by the authors of the theory of 
separation of powers, S. Montesquieu 
and J. Madison, as well as their follow-
ers, who pointed out the need for a bi-
cameral parliament. The problem of 
separation of powers, the formation and 
consolidation of checks and balances, 
and securing a stable government remain 
quite pressing issues for modern Ukraine. 
Studying the role of the chambers of par-
liament in the decision-making and im-
plementation of political decisions (in-
cluding in the sphere of foreign poli-
cy) has allowed broadening of under-
standing of the specifics of the political 
system and political regime of Ukraine, 
the prospects of its democratic develop-
ment, taking into account the introduc-
tion of the bicameral parliament.
In addition, the analysis made it pos-
sible to state that such reform is urgent 
and necessary, but should be carried out 
with the following concepts:
1) it is desirable that upper chamber 
to be a true expression of regional inter-
ests, and therefore, the most optimal way 
of forming the upper chamber – the Sen-
ate, is to elect its members at general 
meetings (colleges) of deputies (or their 
delegates) of local councils of one or 
another region, cities of Kiev and Sev-
astopol, as well as the Autonomous Re-
public of Crimea. A similar method is 
used in France, and it has proven effec-
tive in taking into account the regional 
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sentiments of parliament when making 
important decisions. The lower chamber, 
as an expression of the interests of the 
Ukrainian people, in this case, should be 
elected on the basis of universal, equal 
and direct elections in a proportional 
election system with open lists, although 
openness of the lists is no longer critical.
2) it is necessary to take into account 
the successful American experience of 
the transformation of the order of forma-
tion of the upper chamber, the Senate, 
equal number of representatives from the 
state at the beginning, with the transition 
to the number of representatives depend-
ing on the population, – allows to con-
sider with optimism the modernisation 
of the national model of bicameralism in 
the future. It is also advisable to involve 
in the electoral process through the direct 
participation of representatives of the 
doctrine, providing representation from 
the National Academy of Sciences of 
Ukraine and branch academies of sci-
ence of Ukraine, other reputable insti-
tutes of civil society (one representative 
each).
3) in Ukrainian realities, it is advis-
able to introduce a mechanism for recall-
ing the representatives of the upper 
chamber by the colleges of deputies who 
have delegated them. This will allow the 
senators to liaise with their own regions 
and strengthen their accountability for 
their responsibilities.
4) to ensure the quality of law-mak-
ing, it is permissible to introduce a mod-
el of “equivalent chambers”, following 
the example of Italy. Ability of the upper 
chamber to participate actively in law-
making, the use of a kind of veto on the 
acts adopted by the lower chamber, as a 
consequence, the need for conciliation 
procedures that can significantly im-
prove the quality of laws and other deci-
sions by a single legislative body in 
Ukraine.
The above proposals are completely 
correlated with the vector of European 
integration chosen by our country and 
the intensification of the comprehensive 
reform of the legal system as a whole and 
the practice of law-making in the reali-
ties of today.
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